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An Unemployment
Insurance COVID-19
Crisis Response
Stephen A. Wandner and Christopher J. O’Leary
Te COVID-19 virus is likely to
cause major disruptions in U.S. labor
markets for at least 18 months—until
a vaccine is developed and widely
administered. Any program to help
afected workers and stimulate the U.S.
economy should be carefully targeted
to workers who are most in need of
income support and most likely to
quickly spend these funds in the local
economy.
Four groups of workers will most
likely sufer severe problems during the
COVID-19 crisis:
• Sick individuals whose jobs do
not provide sick leave or sufcient
sick leave.
• Unemployed workers who are
covered by unemployment
insurance (UI) but are deemed
ineligible because they do not
satisfy the requirements for being
able to, being available for, and
actively seeking work, among
other eligibility requirements.
• Unemployed workers who receive
UI benefts but have exhausted
their regular UI benefts.
• Workers not covered by the UI
program, including the selfemployed, contract employees,
and, more generally, “gig workers.”
Tese groups may all sufer earnings
losses because of illness, public health
requirements for social distancing
from coworkers or customers during
the crisis, and declines in economic
demand for the products and services
they provide. Tey may lose labor
income, be ineligible for UI, or
exhaust their benefts. Unless they
have substantial savings, they will be

unable to pay for basic needs—food,
rent, medical care, car payments—for
themselves and their families. Teir
decreased spending will also harm
their local economies.
Proposal
We propose changes to UI
programs to provide income to covered
unemployed workers, to workers still
technically employed but without sick
leave, and to those unemployed but
not covered by UI. Specifcally, two
packages of UI initiatives should be
undertaken, with each limited to an
18-month time frame.
COVID-19 Unemployment Insurance
Program Refnements
• Access to benefts: States should
simplify the UI application
process and provide telephone
support to UI applicants who
have difculty applying for
benefts.
• Able and available: Workers
sufering from COVID-19 or in
a required recovery quarantine
should have the “able and
available” work requirements to
receive UI waived.
• Actively seeking work:
Unemployed workers from jobs
that do not permit sufcient
social distancing from coworkers
and customers should have UI’s
work search requirements lifed.
Workers allowed to telecommute
must continue to work.
• Beneft standards: All states
should be required to ofer

benefts for a potential duration
of at least 26 weeks, and the
maximum weekly beneft amount
should be two-thirds of the
average weekly wage among UIcovered workers in that state.
• Administration: Te federal
government should substantially
increase grants to states to
pay for the administration
of state UI programs, as well
as a new COVID-19 Special
Unemployment Assistance
program (see below).
• Temporary emergency
compensation: A temporary
emergency compensation
program extending the duration
of benefts for 26 weeks should
be made available to all UI
recipients, in all states, regardless
of the unemployment rate. It
should be enacted by Congress
and paid for from federal general
revenue.
• Permanent extended benefts:
Extended benefts should be
federalized and paid from
federal general revenue. Tis
would provide up to 13 weeks of
additional UI benefts when the
state total unemployment rate is
above 5 percent in the preceding
month.
COVID-19 Special
Unemployment Assistance
During the severe 1974–1975
recession, Congress enacted a Special
Unemployment Assistance (SUA)
program that paid benefts to workers
not covered by the regular UI program.
Te program was temporary and
paid with federal general revenue.
A similar temporary program could
be created to pay unemployment
assistance to workers who become sick
from COVID-19 or have been laid of
because they were employed in jobs
that prevent social distancing and
either 1) don’t have or have exhausted
their sick leave or 2) who become
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unemployed and work in uncovered
employment. SUA benefts would
• be payable to self-employed,
contract, and gig economy
workers;
• be payable for up to 52 weeks;
• be paid using state beneft
formulas but with crisis
enhancements to amounts and
durations listed above;
• determine monetary eligibility
by payroll or tax fling records;
• waive “able, available, and
actively seeking work”
requirements as described
above;
• ensure beneft access by having
state UI staf assist with the SUA
application, whether this be a
new process or adapted from
the Disaster Unemployment
Assistance program.
Te temporary UI program
refnements and COVID-19 SUA
program would together provide
income support to the great majority
of workers adversely afected by the
COVID-19 economic shock. State
UI programs across the country
are uniquely suited to enroll new
participants in income transfer
payment programs, process weekly
or biweekly cash payments, and
rapidly establish programs in times
of emergencies. State UI agencies
have experience with Disaster
Unemployment Assistance, the 9/11
airline unemployment assistance
program, and temporary emergency
compensation programs during
recessions.

Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
Stephen A. Wandner is a research fellow at the
Upjohn Institute.
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Disaster Unemployment
Assistance Would Help Gig,
Contract, Self-Employed
Workers Afected by COVID-19
Stephen A. Woodbury
Many, perhaps most, workers who
have lost their jobs as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic will be eligible
to receive regular state unemployment
insurance (UI) benefts for up to 26
weeks. But many other job losers who
have a strong attachment to the labor
force and depend on their earnings—
self-employed workers, contract
workers, gig workers, and others—are
ineligible for UI because they have not
been on the payroll of an employer who
has paid UI taxes on their earnings.
Disaster Unemployment Assistance
(DUA) would make these selfemployed workers, contract workers,
and gig workers eligible to receive UI
benefts. It is almost certainly the most
efective fscal policy tool available to
the federal government to quickly blunt
the economic damage resulting from
the COVID-19 pandemic.
DUA is normally paid to workers
who lose their jobs, but do not qualify
for regular UI benefts, following
natural disasters such as hurricanes,
foods, tornadoes, and geological
disasters like earthquakes and volcanic
eruptions. Te program is initiated by
a presidential disaster declaration and
administered by the state UI agencies,
which in turn are overseen by the U.S.
Department of Labor.
DUA requires no new congressional
legislation—it is authorized by
the Staford Act of 1988—and the
administrative structure needed to
make it run already exists. Because
DUA is funded by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, it
side-steps the eligibility problem faced
by self-employed workers under the
regular state UI program.

Te advantage of DUA over other
modifcations to UI being considered,
such as extended benefts, is that it
assists workers who would otherwise
not receive benefts, and it does so
quickly—typically within two to three
weeks of job loss. As a result, it is
targeted to individuals whose work
and incomes have been interrupted
and who will likely require income for
basics such as rent and utilities, car
payments, and groceries.
In short, DUA would target federal
fnancial assistance to a large group
of workers whose work and pay have
ended as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic, but who are ineligible for
UI benefts because of their selfemployment status. Te legislative
authority exists, and the apparatus to
run the program is ready to go. Only
a presidential disaster declaration
is needed to start what could now
be the most benefcial single fscal
policy action available to the federal
government.
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